Stuxnet was about what happened next

That distinction matters enormously. Irrespective of who gave Stuxnet virtual life, Iran’s nuclear ambitions and capabilities remain poorly understood. Scientists, diplomats and intelligence officials disagree about its behaviour and intentions, the value of diplomacy versus economic sanctions, and the possibility of military intervention.

Given these uncertainties, any serious state-sponsored technical initiative to undermine a secretive nuclear programme would have a dual mission: first, to exploit known systems vulnerabilities and – arguably most important – to discover which individuals and institutions are brought in (and when) to deal with the problem. This worm was consequently much more than a weapon; it was a mechanism designed to generate actionable intelligence. This scenario is not idle speculation. Cyber-conflict doctrines of China, the US, Russia, Israel and – reportedly – the UK emphasise the potential intelligence benefits of “information operations”. Yesterday’s “mole” has become today’s “worm”.

That is strategic espionage. Targeted acts of sabotage disrupt, but the real pay-off comes from identifying the human and technical links in the chain of command. Observing who responds – and when – to worm-driven destruction helps illuminate who really runs Iran’s nuclear infrastructures. Real-world Iranian responses offer critical clues as to which scientists, administrators and engineers are trusted and who is suspect. The chance to monitor Iran’s response would be of great interest to Mossad, the International Atomic Energy Agency, America’s CIA and/or Britain’s GCHQ.

Crafting a worm that generates potential insight into all those issues represents an intelligence coup. It is as potentially revelatory as a WikiLeaks data dump. That is why interpreting Stuxnet as desperate stop-gap or one-off intervention almost certainly misunderstands its purpose. Sabotage here is a means to an end; it is a gambit to make Iran’s nuclear processes more transparent.

Iran’s nuclear elite and Ministry of Intelligence know this. It is no secret now to the mullahs that their responses to the Stuxnet breach were closely monitored by external intelligence agencies. Their internal security is furiously trying to assess what information might have inadvertently been revealed.

Cyber-conflict critics do not hesitate to point out that digitally dependent western “critical infrastructures” are remarkably vulnerable to comparable attack. They understandably fear that Stuxnet may set unfortunate precedents in unconventional warfare. Focusing on the sabotage, they argue that Stuxnet is a tactic that buys a little time and security at great potential cost.

But, for obvious reasons, critics cannot know what secrets this worm has unearthed. The operational damage may, indeed, be limited, as a report by the Institute for Science and International Security suggested this week. But Stuxnet created a window into the Iranian national security apparatus. Espionage, not sabotage, is its force multiplier.

This strategy is not new. During the second world war, British and American scientists devised scores of devious electronic countermeasures designed to trick Nazi radar and divert flak and fighters away from Allied bomber streams. All manner of still-classified digital decoys, spoofs and “ghosts” were used in both Gulf wars to fool Iraqi forces into revealing their covert locations.

As logistics, weaponry and command and control systems have become more digital and networked, the opportunities for espionage and sabotage increase in lock-step. “Titan Rain”, for example, is the US government’s code name for a series of digital attacks believed to be from China on computer networks at Lockheed Martin and Nasa.

It is imperative for national security establishments worldwide to better understand the roles these virtual spies can play. Did Stuxnet’s worm undermine Iranian nuclear capabilities? That should not be the dominant question. Has Stuxnet significantly expanded the west’s options in confronting Iran? Western diplomats and militaries likely hope so.